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When are medical apps medical? Off-label use
and the Food and Drug Administration
William H Krieger
Abstract
People have a love/hate relationship with rapidly changing healthcare technology. While consumer demand for medical
apps continues to grow as rapidly as does supply (there are over 100,000 health, wellness and medical applications, or
‘apps’ on the market), healthcare professionals and safety experts worry about the impact of these apps on the health
consumer. In response to the rapidly growing mobile healthcare sector, the Food and Drug Administration has put forth
guidelines to regulate ‘mobile medical apps’ (MMAs), those health-related apps that are (self) designated as medical
devices. In this article, I argue that this decision, to only regulate apps that bill themselves as medical devices, will create a
market for ‘off-label’ app use. Further, I will talk about the oft used analogy between off-label apps and off-label pharma-
ceuticals, showing that off-labeling apps will provide patients none of the benefits that come with a physician prescribing a
drug off-label, while exposing the mobile healthcare consumer to significant risks that go significantly beyond those that we
know of (and must accept) from prescription drugs. Recognizing that the Food and Drug Administration is not going to be
able to significantly change its policies on oversight, I will suggest specific actions to at least mitigate some of the risks
associated with off-label app use.
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Introduction
Healthcare providers have known for many years that
an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. In
recent years, this (somewhat tired) phrase has translated
into concrete changes in medical practice. Healthcare
professionals have been moving away from solely treat-
ing illnesses when they appear and are instead focusing
more on the early detection of disease, on better main-
tenance of chronic health conditions and on changes to
lifestyle (i.e. smoking cessation, dieting and increased
ﬁtness), hoping to avoid costly procedures and chronic
problems ‘down the road’. Recognizing the cost-saving
potential of early detection, many of these health
improvement trends have become incentives built into
both the Aﬀordable Care Act and private insurance
company policies.
On the consumer side, medical technology
companies have jumped onto the preventative care
bandwagon, selling products to enable consumers to
self-diagnose, thereby believing that they are in charge
of their own health. In fact, as of 2013, there were
43,689 medical (as opposed to the broader ‘wellness’
category) smartphone applications available at
Apple’s app store.1 The app-fueled empowerment of
the health consumer comes with costs, as concerns
with medical apps over safety,2 eﬃcacy and accuracy,3
privacy4 and conﬂict of interest5 have resulted in a
demand by both the USA and the European Union
(EU) for proper oversight of these medical adjuncts.
The question (or one question) according to Daniel
Rhon, editor of Medical App, is how to reconcile
the need for new information with the need for safety:
‘A critical aspect of this process is the right balance
between regulation and freedom to innovate.
Too far in one direction can result in issues
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of patient protection, but too far in the other direction
will stiﬂe development and innovation’.6
This desire to balance safety with innovation had led
the USA’s Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to
suggest a sliding scale approach to the oversight of
medical apps. In JAMA 2014, Powell, Landman and
Bates argue that the FDA will focus on apps to the
degree that they act as medical devices: ‘In general,
apps that provide precise treatment recommendations
and diagnostic information will receive more regulatory
attention’.7 The FDA’s approach, which seems quite
sensible (as there are clear diﬀerences between apps
that provide diet tips and those making diagnostic deci-
sions for patients), requires the FDA to ﬁnd a way to
draw a line between medical device apps and wellness
apps. The FDA’s ﬁnal guidelines, designed to allow for
innovation while protecting the public, attempt to
thread this needle. However, their method for identify-
ing medical apps is based on one highly problematic
premise, that an app developer will disclose whether it
intends its app to be used for medical (as opposed to
educational or entertainment) purposes. In other
words, the FDA will only evaluate apps that market
themselves as medical devices, while apps that declare
themselves to be in other categories may go straight to
market. Although it is impossible (and unwise) to argue
that all apps labeling themselves as a resource are doing
so to hide from scrutiny, there is good reason to believe
that some would and, unfortunately, there do not
appear to be provisions for the FDA to otherwise inves-
tigate whether or not to assert that an app is medical
after it has given itself another label, or under any other
circumstance.
Apparently, the FDA is not alone in having limited
resources when it comes to targeting medical apps.
Although there are some diﬀerences between the situ-
ation in the USA and Europe, the USA’s current pos-
ition on medical apps is similar to the one being reﬁned
in Europe. According to its 2014 Green Paper on
mobile health,8 the EU’s Medical Devices Directive
(MDD) calls some medical apps en vitro diagnostic
equipment and views others as medical devices, with
still others not belonging in either category. Putting
aside diﬀerences in categorization and terminology
between the USA and Europe, diﬀerences that have
more to do with ﬁnding the proper ‘home’ for medical
apps in existing regulatory structures for each govern-
ment, (interesting, but falling outside the scope of this
paper) the MDD, like the FDA, has made the decision
to leave the question of whether an app should be
considered a ‘medical app’ up to the manufacturer.
Of course, it is entirely rational to focus more on
those apps that act more like medical devices and less
on other wellness apps, as nobody believes that the
FDA should spend considerable time and money on
an alarm clock just because it boasts its ability to
help people monitor their circadian rhythm. However,
there is a real diﬀerence between this reasonable
approach and further restricting the FDA by focusing
on the app developer’s intended use. The FDA’s deci-
sion has in reality left both app makers and app con-
sumers to their own devices (so to speak) when trying
to navigate the regulatory landscape. According to
medical educators Lewis and Wyatt:
The lack of clarity regarding when a medical app
becomes a formal medical device means that many
developers may not recognize that their app requires
formal regulation. As a result, the vast majority of
medical apps remain without any form of regulation
or safety check, and some of these may present a
patient safety or other risk.9
Although it is diﬃcult to pinpoint the amount of risk
present in any particular app, the danger here lies in the
presence of a gap in safety standards that allows
unchecked apps to be used as pieces of medical
equipment.
The danger in this case is that any app can be used
by anyone, regardless of its label. Speciﬁcally, an app
marketed for education or entertainment could be used
as a medical device, regardless of its original purpose.
When a healthcare provider or consumer deems that
an app marketed as having a non-medical purpose is
now to be used for medical diagnosis or treatment,
that person or group is doing so ‘oﬀ-label’. Oﬀ-label
use could include apps that, regardless of origin, medical
schools require students to use for diagnostic work.
Similarly, doctors could tell patients to use particular
apps to monitor their health.10 Finally, health consu-
mers, lacking a doctor’s ability to distinguish medical
information from nonsense, might download certain
apps in order to stay or become healthy. As further
proof of the inadequacies of app labeling, even in cases
where apps are clearly marked as jokes, a cursory read of
their reviews shows in numerous angry end-users, claim-
ing that the apps they downloaded did not cause their
phone’s camera ﬂash to clear up their skin, improve
their eyesight or cure their skin cancer, while others
say that they cannot believe that blowing at the screen
(as another app requires) did not accurately result in the
app displaying their blood alcohol content.11
Although it might seem easy to blame this situation
on oﬀ-labeling in general, there are other examples of
FDA-controlled industries using oﬀ-labeling with more
success. Speciﬁcally, both pharmaceuticals and medical
devices have to go through FDA testing in order to
be used in the USA. These approvals are speciﬁc,
with a given drug being used at a particular dosage
(and administered in a certain way) to a clearly deﬁned
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population to treat a particular condition. When that
drug is prescribed by a doctor in other contexts (at a
diﬀerent dosage, with a diﬀerent delivery system, for a
diﬀerent population or as a treatment for a diﬀerent
condition), the doctor who writes the prescription for
that approved pharmaceutical or piece of medical tech-
nology for a non-FDA approved purpose is using that
medication ‘oﬀ-label’.
There are good reasons for doctors to prescribe
drugs or use medical devices oﬀ-label, despite the
well-known risks associated with these practices.12 As
such, it might seem that, analogously, app oﬀ-labeling
might be something for the public to welcome (employ-
ing similar cautions). However, this article will show
that there are dangers for app oﬀ-labeling that are
both serious and unique to app development and mar-
keting and the dangers of this system outweigh the
potential utility of using any particular unregulated
app. To address these issues, the FDA (or any group
taking up the regulatory challenge) will need to focus
more on whether apps have medical applications (and
less on app intent). Additionally, this article will argue
for the need for post app-store oversight of a wider
range of apps than are currently on the FDA’s ‘medical
app’ list. As these changes would be impossible to
make, given the veil of secrecy surrounding medical
app production, a third ‘demand’ will be for the FDA
to require that app information be more readily avail-
able to the public. To this end, this paper will do the
following: summarize the app regulatory system
recently put in place by the FDA; compare that
system to the FDA’s pharmaceutical and medical
device regulatory apparatus; show the implications of
oﬀ-labeling within both regulatory systems. The paper
will conclude with speciﬁc recommendations that
would allow for better oversight of apps both pre and
post-listing in the app-store marketplace.
Regulation of medical apps
The nearly universal rush for health metrics, by gov-
ernments, by the health insurance industry, by
pharmaceutical companies and by health consumers
themselves has resulted in a ﬂood of mobile healthcare
(mHealth) hardware and software, created for
and marketed to both health professionals and the
general public. The 100,000 plus medical, health and
wellness apps on the market perform a wide variety of
functions within this niche, ranging from collating
existing information to proposing speciﬁc types of
treatments (not to mention apps that only pretend
to be medical and that are designed for entertainment
purposes).
While a handheld medical dictionary is (probably)
innocuous, other types of apps, without regulation or
oversight (other than by the app-store), might act in
ways that could cause health consumers to make app-
based decisions, cause consumers to believe that their
health is being accurately monitored by their mobile
devices or have a signiﬁcant impact on their actual
health. As a result, medical apps have become a real
source of concern to the medical (and larger scientiﬁc)
community, as well as to consumer protection groups.
Alerted to this problem, the US Department of Health
and Human Services put together a panel to study this
problem with the goal of putting together a regulatory
apparatus for medial apps under the FDA’s existing
oversight authority.
Hoping to reconcile the need for safety with the
explosive nature of app development (and understand-
ing the groups interested in both of these goals), HHS
Secretary Kathleen Sebelius introduced the FDA’s
response: ‘This proposed strategy is designed to pro-
mote innovation and provide technology to consumers
and health care providers while maintaining patient
safety’.13 The FDA’s strategy is to ﬁnd a place for med-
ical apps within its existing regulatory structure and the
best ﬁt is to see medical apps as medical devices. To the
FDA, a medical device is as follows:
an instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, con-
trivance, implant, in vitro reagent or other similar or
related article, including a component part or accessory
which is:
 recognized in the oﬃcial National Formulary,
or the US Pharmacopoeia, or any supplement
to them;
 intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or
other conditions, or in the cure, mitigation,
treatment or prevention of disease, in man or
other animals;
 intended to aﬀect the structure or any function
of the body of man or other animals and which
does not achieve its primary intended purposes
through chemical action within or on the body
of man or other animals and which is not
dependent upon being metabolized for the
achievement of any of its primary intended
purposes.14
The FDA policy on medical apps is as follows:
If a product is labeled, promoted or used in a manner
that meets the following deﬁnition in section 201(h)
of the Federal Food Drug & Cosmetic (FD&C) Act
it will be regulated by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) as a medical device and is sub-
ject to pre-marketing and post-marketing regulatory
controls.15
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Although some have made arguments about the
FDA’s decision to limit its scrutiny based on their
narrow deﬁnition of a medical device,16 my concern is
instead with the preamble (as I call it) to the deﬁnition,
where the FDA limits itself to regulating only those app
makers who themselves deﬁne their products as medical
devices. 17 According to the preamble: ‘Whether a
smart device or app is classiﬁed as a medical device
depends on its intended use described by the manufac-
turer. If the intended use matches certain criteria, the
manufacturer has to ensure that all appropriate regula-
tions are observed’.18 This decision to only pursue apps
that declare themselves to be medical devices will allow
the vast majority of health-related apps to go to market
without regulation. For instance, Deborah Lupton
found an app used in medical schools called
WAGMobile:
The developer of the app directed at educating second-
year medical students, WAGMobile is a generalist app
development company that provides apps for clients in
numerous categories. It does not provide any details of
how the content is generated, and indeed oﬀers a dis-
claimer at the bottom of the app description that notes:
‘‘Please do not take any action based on the content of
this app’’; an odd caution given that the material is
marketed at accomplishing training for medical
students.19
If, in the best case scenario, apps made for various
purposes are being brought into medical practice
(regardless of the intent of the manufacturer) and if,
in a worst case scenario, an environment exists where
app makers could choose to avoid scrutiny by labeling
themselves as ‘entertainment’ or ‘reference material’,
the current landscape of app regulation has left the
public open to signiﬁcant private and public health
issues. This danger is a direct result of the subject of
this paper, the oﬀ-labeling of apps.
The path to off-labeling
Both health consumers and providers have a real inter-
est in having access to quality health apps and both
groups have an incredibly tough time ﬁnding apps
that they can trust. Faisal Ali of the University of
Manchester’s Dermatology Center argues that the
aforementioned issues surrounding smartphones
should cause us to abandon smartphones as mobile
health devices altogether:
Mobile health care (mHealth), the practice of medicine
supported by mobile technologies, is advocated as a
means to improve patient care. However, the
mHealth market is presently saturated with a surfeit
of largely unregulated mHealth apps. Knowledge of
which apps may be helpful to a particular patient’s
care and ease of use (or lack thereof) may dissuade
clinicians from engaging with mHealth.20
The source of researchers and scholars’ frustration
comes, on the one hand, from not being able to look
under the hood of medical apps. App makers need not
include any information on whether their apps were
created under the guidance of health professionals
and they do not provide data on whether their apps
are accurate in their data gathering or interpretation.
In Evidence Based Medicine Bujink, Visser and
Marshall report that: ‘Most medical apps lack authen-
ticity details; authors, manufacturers and distributors
are not listed and references are unavailable or out-
of-date’.21 Clinical researchers Lewis and Wyatt say
that those who want answers are forced to do this
research themselves. This means that there are few stu-
dies, and that they are based on speciﬁc apps or medical
problems, making results diﬃcult to generalize. Even
given these restrictions, researchers have found real
problems and have gone to the trouble of publishing
them in clinical and professional journals:
Despite this, several studies have highlighted a number
of medical apps that can compromise patient safety and
are potentially dangerous in clinical use. For example,
certain apps designed for opioid dosage conversion or
melanoma detection demonstrate dangerously poor
accuracy, while a number of other medical apps do not
follow evidence-based guidelines. Such risks have led to
recent calls for increased regulation before further use
and adoption of some apps in clinical practice. One issue
highlighted by a small number of studies is that many
app developers have little or no formal medical training
and do not involve clinicians in the development process
and may therefore be unaware of patient safety issues
raised by inappropriate app content or functioning.
Another issue is the sheer volume and exponential
growth of medical apps, meaning it is practically impos-
sible to assess each and every medical app.22
If, as the authors conclude, gaps in expertise,
coupled with a high volume of (and a high demand
for) these new medical adjuncts, are at fault here, this
means that larger studies need to be pursued before
medical apps should play a real role in improving
healthcare.
Of course, there is pushback on these criticisms from
people connected to the app industry. For example,
researchers Visser and Korevaar argue that medical
knowledge need not have any impact on app perform-
ance: ‘To our best knowledge, there is no published
evidence that apps developed in collaboration with
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health professionals are actually superior to apps devel-
oped without health professionals involved in the app
development’.23 Others believe that the best way to
regulate apps is to let the market sort itself out.
According to the FDA’s Bakul Patel: ‘The whole
mobile application world has its own
ecosystem . . .Mobile apps live and die and it’s all
user- or consumer-driven. The end-of-life cycle is so
short compared to any other products we see’.24
To those who might wish to apply a more traditional
approach to medical device oversight to medical apps,
critics like Drs Chan and Misra point out rightly in
JAMA that current methods used to police medical
devices are inadequate to handle medical apps:
The challenge in both certiﬁcation and clinical evidence
is that traditional methods have not adapted to the fast
paced nature of technology. Traditional randomized
clinical trials are expensive, lengthy endeavors, which
mHealth researchers have often lamented. Researchers
aiming to systematically evaluate apps have found
that the applications they were evaluating were
being updated as frequently as every 3 weeks. A clinical
trial that began the institutional review board approval
process in October 2011 using the just-released
iPhone 4S would be using outdated technology less
than 1 year later because the iPhone 5 was released in
September 2012.25
Recognizing the FDA’s backlog, some private
groups have taken it upon themselves to provide certi-
ﬁcations for medical apps. For instance, the non-proﬁt
Health On the Net Foundation claims to be able to rate
and certify medical apps as both safe and eﬀective:
‘‘However, the Health On the Net Foundation’s
HONcode takes 12 to 18 months to review a web-
site’’.25 This time lag is signiﬁcant, as apps can appear
and disappear within a few weeks.
Given the rapid pace of medical app development,
the FDA’s decision to focus only on apps that are
‘really really’ medical makes sense. Even with the
current structure, the FDA is overwhelmed, with a sig-
niﬁcant backlog of apps to investigate (as noted above).
Unfortunately, the FDA’s additional decision to eﬀect-
ively cede its authority to app makers, by only review-
ing those medical apps whose developers are conﬁdent
enough in their product to so label them, results in the
current worry, the consequences of oﬀ-labeling.
The analogy: Pharmaceutical and medical device
companies and app makers
Medical apps are not the ﬁrst (or only) medical tool
that can be used oﬀ-label. Both medical devices and
prescription and over-the-counter (OTC)
pharmaceuticals are regularly used oﬀ-label, with doc-
tors routinely prescribing them for purposes completely
unrelated to their original approval. ‘In many coun-
tries, doctors are free to prescribe oﬀ-label and do so
frequently, although in some countries restrictions are
placed on oﬀ-label prescribing; for example, by health
insurance companies and individual institutions’.26 Of
course, the use of oﬀ-label prescriptions and medical
devices is not problem-free, but there are signiﬁcant
beneﬁts attached to their use. In addition to allowing
medications and medical technology to be used in
populations generally deemed too small (or vulnerable)
for large scale randomized control trials,27 oﬀ-labeling
allows a physician to try new treatments when others
have failed and do not need special approval for use by
a physician so long as her/his intent is ‘the practice of
medicine’. While oﬀ-labeled drugs and medical devices
do not have to go through all of the targeted scrutiny of
an approved use, they have all been approved by the
FDA as being (at least) safe in their original context.28
That being said, there are risks when medications and
medical devices are used oﬀ-label, with potential
impacts on patient health, on innovation, and on
drug and technology costs. For medications:
It undercuts expectations that drug safety and eﬃcacy
have been fully evaluated. When newer, more expensive
drugs are used oﬀ-label, it increases health care costs.
It undermines the incentives for manufacturers to
perform rigorous studies — and instead subtly encour-
ages them to game the system by seeking approval for
secondary indications for which clinical trials are less
complicated and less expensive. And oﬀ-label use may
discourage evidence-based practice.29
In addition, in both medical and ‘risk’ literature,
there are a number of ongoing discussions on problems
revolving around the role of the FDA in regard to
pharmaceuticals and medical devices (for approved
and oﬀ-label use). These range from critiques of the
guiding principles behind the FDA’s focus on safety
over eﬃcacy,30 to questions about implementation
and post-approval review,31 to ways that manufac-
turers have either ignored bans on marketing for
oﬀ-label uses of meds and medical devices32 or to
ways they have shifted their aggressive in-oﬃce market-
ing of their wares from doctors to nurses and other
oﬃce staﬀ.33
The point of this paper is not to argue against the
use of pharmaceuticals and medical devices oﬀ-label.
There are signiﬁcant concerns that need to be addressed
by a physician exercising this option and any
oﬀ-labeling scenario places an additional onus of
responsibility on the physician. Accordingly, the FDA
cautions: ‘If physicians use a product for an indication
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not in the approved labeling, they have the responsibil-
ity to be well informed about the product, and to base
its use on ﬁrm scientiﬁc rationale and sound medical
evidence’.34 If the physician is able to meet these stand-
ards, and armed with the knowledge that the drug has
already gone through safety screening in another con-
text, s/he is medically (and legally) cleared to administer
that product. Regardless of liability, however, adminis-
tering a medication in a new way could easily lead to
new risks. Added to this is the fact that, sometimes, a
medicine that has cleared FDA hurdles ends up doing
signiﬁcant harm years after it has been approved. These
issues have led groups to argue that the FDA’s focus on
pre-approval limits its ability to monitor the safety and
eﬀectiveness of medical devices35 and drugs.36
Professor, medical doctor and attorney Jennifer Bard,
in the Indiana Health Review, argues:
Having outlined the many ways that these failures of
post-market oversight had caused harm, [this article]
recommended that the FDA take a ‘lifecycle approach’
to its task of making sure that the drugs prescribed to
the public were both safe and eﬀective.37
The concerns of Bard and others in the legal and
medical community resulted in Congress extending
the FDA’s ability to require manufacturers to conduct
their own research studies to assess the safety and eﬃ-
cacy of the drugs they sell, not just before seeking FDA
approval, but afterwards as well.38 As a result, medical
professionals know that when they recommend or pre-
scribe OTC39 or prescription medicines or medical
devices oﬀ-label, they do so based on well-known safe-
guards and risks and drug and medical device compa-
nies know that they have an ongoing responsibility to
produce safe and eﬀective products.
The problem being introduced in this paper is not
with the analogue (medications and medical devices),
but with the analogy itself. Medical apps carry all of the
risks mentioned above for OTC and prescription drugs
and medical devices (risks that might be considered
either acceptable or at least familiar). But, additionally,
apps undergo none of the measures that might make
them as safe as the aforementioned medications or
devices.
One way to frame this new threat is to contrast med-
ical app use with the widespread acceptance of other
quasi-medical items.40 When a doctor suggests that a
person suﬀering from a sore throat drink herbal tea or
that the best thing for the ﬂu is a big bowl of chicken
soup, the medical professional has every reason to
believe that this ‘prescription’ will, at worst, do no
harm. This is because the FDA has already made sure
that the foods we get in the store meet safety standards.
So, even if these therapies do not actually help, at least
they will not hurt. Additionally, the FDA requires that
herbal remedies contain warning statements (in some
cases, ‘black box’ warning) to alert consumers as to
their possible dangers. Granting that so many people
ignore warnings that the FDA has forced tobacco com-
panies to have huge and rather gruesome pictures on
boxes of cigarettes to make the warnings harder to
miss, medical apps do not even give medical consumers
this simple warning. US consumers are under the
impression that their government would never allow a
company to sell something that it knows would hurt
people. As a result, when consumers purchase an app
to improve their health, whether they do so on their
own or under their doctor or their health insurance
provider’s guidance, they have a reasonable expectation
that the app will, like that cup of soup, do no harm.
Kicking a dead analogy: Oversight of meds
and apps in three easy steps
When the government decided to regulate medical
apps, it decided to designate them as ‘medical devices’,
putting them under the authority of the FDA.
Although this was probably the best choice available
to those in favor of regulation, this decision allowed for
the creation of a dangerous analogy, connecting the
idea of oﬀ-labeling of apps to the oﬀ-labeling of other
medical devices and pharmaceuticals. In fact, while the
oﬀ-labeling of meds and medical devices has its prob-
lems, the real beneﬁts to populations who would not
otherwise have access to these medications and devices
more than balances the risk equation. The problem
with oﬀ-labeling medical apps is that it shares all of
the problems with using pharmaceuticals and medical
devices oﬀ-label with none of the safeguards. Working
with and against the aforementioned analogy, this
author will oﬀer three suggestions to help make safer
(or at least mitigate harm from) oﬀ-labeled apps.
Suggestion 1: Post approval (or post certification)
study. While pharmaceuticals and medical devices may
not be approved for a particular population, they all
have to go through extensive safety testing in labora-
tory and then clinical trials,41 testing that is totally
absent from app development. In fact, as mentioned
above, many apps do not have clear ties to medical
professionals. As such (and arguing against the argu-
ment above by Visser and Korevaar) without oversight
by people used to working with patients, app devel-
opers might not even consider such testing when bring-
ing their wares to market. While nobody worries about
the accuracy of the physics behind Angry Birds, having
a poorly calibrated or inaccurate glucose monitor,
stethoscope or electrocardiogram app could result in
serious harm.
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Further, the FDA notes that, despite its extensive
regulatory system, harmful drugs have occasionally
made it to the market.42 Indeed, concerns about this
problem were the impetus for Congress extending the
FDA’s ability to require manufacturers to conduct their
own research studies to assess the safety and eﬃcacy of
the drugs they sell, not just before seeking FDA
approval but afterwards as well. Noting the special
issues surrounding oﬀ-label use of pharmaceuticals,
some experts have suggested an increased focus on
post-market research and regulation:
The FDA might consider undertaking a range of
new activities in regulating oﬀ-label use, including
systematically collecting postmarketing data to quan-
tify the harms and beneﬁts of common oﬀ-label uses;
synthesizing evidence regarding oﬀ-label uses and
disseminating its reports; scrutinizing marketing eﬀorts
to restrict materials on oﬀ-label uses that don’t have
strong support; increasing the use of active drugs as
comparators in postmarketing clinical trials; and
requiring information about anticipated oﬀ-label uses
to be presented at the time of a drug’s review for initial
approval.43
Similarly, recognizing that there is no way to
exhaustively test biologics and medical devices for
every possible post-market use, some medical research-
ers have argued the need for post approval study and
regulation:
Regardless of study design, the approval or clearance
process cannot identify every possible safety concern.
Postmarketing safety surveillance partially addresses
this knowledge gap by providing information based
on real-world use of medical products in heterogeneous
populations and detecting adverse events that were not
observed in the clinical trials—possibly because they
occur infrequently in any population (e.g., aplastic
anemia) or because individuals in whom such events
are most likely to occur were not enrolled in the trials
(e.g., spontaneous abortion, because pregnant women
were excluded).44
Given convincing arguments for the FDA to do
post-market research on drugs and medical devices,
presumably already deemed safe, the FDA should
amend its medical app approval process to similarly
evaluate medical apps by the way that they are used
(as opposed to the way that they are marketed) after
they have gone on the market (as there is no ‘approval’
process for apps, the best analogue is to evaluate them
after they have been listed on an app store). While
imperfect, at least the FDA would have the ability
to study apps that are clearly being used for medical
purposes, instead of being hamstrung (as their cur-
rent mandate would suggest they are), unable to act
to protect the public from a demonstrably
dangerous app.
Suggestion 2: External review. One especially relevant cri-
tique of having the FDA expand its review of apps is
that the FDA is already backlogged (as noted above)
with the relatively few apps it is currently charged to
review. While the FDA could meet some of those needs
by forcing app makers (as they do with drug and med-
ical device makers) to take on some of the responsibility
for testing and reporting, this action would be both
insuﬃcient and, at times, problematic for app makers
For one thing, forcing app makers to pay for post-
marketing studies would be insuﬃcient in that the
FDA would be asking a group to police itself. Just as
there is a real risk (as described above) of a medical app
company calling its app ‘entertainment’ to avoid scru-
tiny, asking an app company to evaluate its own soft-
ware would give rise to similar temptations. Stories
of companies underreporting problematic data45 or of
those companies dropping people from studies or
otherwise manipulating data in order to meet FDA
scrutiny46 are well known in the world of pharmaceut-
icals and the FDA is either powerless (or penniless) to
bring its regulatory power to bear in every instance of
fraud, even when it can ﬁnd it. Additionally, forcing
app makers to, like drug companies, take on the time
and expense of self-reporting would take the analogy
between meds and apps too far. Drug makers and med-
ical device makers are (for the most part) huge compa-
nies. As such, they have a lot of capital that they can
use to bring their products to market. Forcing them to
take on some of the regulatory burden will cut into
their proﬁts, but it will not bankrupt their companies
(except, this author supposes, if none of their products
can stand up to even their scrutiny). App makers, in
some cases, are not large, cash rich, corporations.
Many of the most popular apps out on the market
were developed by individuals or by small teams of
people47 and, further, many of these apps are free
(whether ad sponsored or not) or very inexpensive.
Although app development can result in a large
payoﬀ, (especially when whose apps get bought out
by large companies like Facebook or Google), few if
any of these developers would have been able to bring
an app to market if they had been forced to pay for
extensive post-market reporting. This would have been
a total innovation killer, exactly the result that the
FDA wanted to avoid.
One way for the medical app community to avoid
the imperfect (and inapplicable) model used by the
FDA when it comes to drugs and other medical devices
might be look to the private sector for post-marketing
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information. This could be done by an academic
approach, commissioning more peer-reviewed studies
of particular sorts of apps or by a ‘Consumer
Reports’ approach, generating reviews from companies
interested in app safety and reliability.
On the academic side, medical researchers have been
evaluating apps for some time now, without any help or
guidance from outside sources. That being said, the
academic approach has been stymied to a large extent
by researchers being unable to get information about
the apps under study. Without knowing about the app
(i.e. the background of the app-making process, pos-
sible conﬂicts of interest in the creators), researchers
report (as discussed above) that their ability to draw
conclusions about apps remains limited. Other impedi-
ments to app research have more to do with the aca-
demic’s home than the app’s creators. For instance,
researchers have a limited amount of time; time that
they might need to spend on their primary research.
When academics have to budget their time in ways to
ensure their academic appointments, they may not be
able to devote the time and resources necessary to ﬁght
the good ﬁght. Additionally, there are a limited number
of journals interested in publishing articles on medical
apps and, to make things even worse, apps quickly
appear, disappear and change, which might mean that
the app you wrote about in your publication may not
exist (or be recognizable) by the time a journal article
gets published. This (again) can dissuade researchers
from spending their time studying medical apps,
regardless of the researcher’s interest. That being said,
researchers have published on app eﬃcacy and those
sorts of publications are invaluable to those in the med-
ical community who want information on apps coming
out in their ﬁelds.
On the corporate side, a number of companies have
devoted themselves to rating medical apps, leading some
to imagine that this sort of ‘market based’ system might
be able to ﬁll in the gaps present in the academic model.
However, even these companies have not been able to
keep up with the massive inﬂux of medical apps.
Additionally, medical app review companies have their
own limitations. For instance, there are real questions
about the economic viability of private companies that
oﬀer to credential medical apps.48 Given that each com-
pany hopes to become the gold standard in the industry
for app credentialing, each review company has created
its own proprietary algorithm to rate submissions, lead-
ing the healthcare professional or consumer little way to
compare between rating agencies. By keeping their com-
parison methods a secret, these companies (perhaps
unwittingly) have made it diﬃcult for there to be any
outside review of that rating agency’s standards (a sort
of ‘who watches the Watchmen’ eﬀect). One of the
strengths of academic work is that is open to peer
review, a process that can ﬁnd and help eradicate
errors in the original researcher’s work. Here, the pro-
prietary nature of a competitive business culture can
lead to errors with serious consequences:
This became apparent at the end of 2013, when
Happtique, a mobile health solutions company and
subsidiary of the Greater New York Hospital
Associations for-proﬁt arm GNYHA Ventures, sus-
pended its mobile health app certiﬁcation program
after serious security issues had been found in apps
Happtique had previously certiﬁed as secure.49
Although both of these approaches are not without
problems, both have real potential to ﬁll in the gap left
by the FDA’s current program of medical app review.
That being said, any review, whether by the FDA or by
outside groups, can only occur if data about medical
apps are available. This problem, highlighted above in
reference to the academic community, but certainly
equally an issue for app review companies, can be
resolved by demanding that information be made avail-
able by the app makers, which is this paper’s ﬁnal
suggestion.
Suggestion 3: Transparency. One of the most often cited
complaints by those scrutinizing medical apps is that
they are inscrutable. As noted above, it is impossible to
ﬁnd out whether a medical app was created or tested by
people working as medical clinicians or researchers.
Absent (or in addition to) actual oversight of all med-
ical apps, the FDA should use its powers to demand a
standardized ‘label’ for all health and wellness apps.
Citing limitations of both commercial certiﬁcations
and peer-review, another alternative has been sug-
gested,50 placing the onus on app manufacturers to pro-
vide standardized information, e.g. app-synopses and
checklists to the user, information that would be avail-
able on both the manufacturer’s website and at the
appropriate point of sale (i.e. app store). The informa-
tion being provided could be used to educate consumers
on the beneﬁts of a particular app, on its eﬃcacy in
laboratory or real-world tests, on its makers and back-
ers and on the information that it can provide to (and
on the information that it can collect from) the pro-
spective consumer or healthcare provider.
Additionally, this information could be used to lay
the groundwork for better external studies of medical
apps (as called for above), which would lead to a better-
informed medical community.
All in all, the provided information can also be used for
an unoﬃcial but collaborative evaluation process of all
interested parties, for example, patients, doctors, but
also competitors; this may also be an additional
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building block on the path toward informed patients in
the information age.51
While giving competitors (and consumers) easier
comparative data might not be in the best interests of
medical app developers, this information is crucial if
medical professionals are going to be able to make
good judgments when they ‘prescribe’ certain apps to
their patients. As mentioned above, in addition, asking
patients to connect their ﬁtness trackers to healthcare
portal apps and to medical health records, doctors rely
on medical apps during their training,52 use them in
their practices and suggest them to their patients.
There is a possibility, and to Lewis and Wyatt, a real
potential, for apps to cause injury to patients when they
misuse (or at times trust) a particular app to monitor or
treat symptoms:
Perhaps the biggest threat to patient safety from med-
ical apps is likely to result from inadequate education
and knowledge of health care professionals and
patients about their risks. We think in the vast majority
of cases, it is probably the actions of a user resulting
from a speciﬁc app that leads to harm, rather than the
app itself.53
The diﬀerence between health and harm is education
and medical providers (at least) need to have the ability
to give medical apps a quick check up.54 Again follow-
ing the analogy, doctors and pharmacists oﬀer medical
guidance to people using medications and medical
devices, both in the doctor’s oﬃce and at the point of
sale. Apps should similarly come with clear information
so that doctors can make good decisions on their use,
comfortable that their prescriptions are being properly
followed.
Conclusion
Balancing innovation with safety is always diﬃcult and,
in an environment of rapid change, low proﬁt margins
for app developers and an overburdened regulatory
agency, there are good reasons to argue against forcing
every inventor and invention to be subject to the sort of
outside scrutiny that we rightly demand for medical
devices. Additionally, given the FDA’s inability to
keep up with the stream of apps either on the market
or coming out soon, the decision to do pre-approval
regulation based on self-reporting is apparently a neces-
sary evil.
That being said, given the outbreak of apps and
given the need for the FDA to use triage to handle
the volume and urgency of this problem without crush-
ing an industry that all agree can improve both quality
and access of care to the public, I oﬀer three sugges-
tions to push app regulation forward. Following the
analogy between meds and medical devices and medical
apps, there needs to be some sort of post-approval scru-
tiny put in place by the FDA for those apps that are
being used for medical purposes (in addition to its pre-
screening of apps that declare themselves to be med-
ical). Next, and against the aforementioned analogy,
there should be an increased push (which could include
increased incentives) for the external review of health
apps by both medical professionals and private compa-
nies. This mixed model of response could both protect
the FDA from having to stretch its scant resources, it
could spawn new growth in both academic and business
circles and it would promote more innovation by app
makers. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the
FDA must demand some sort of standardized, publi-
cally accessible labeling by the medical app industry.
This information is critical for any sort of serious
review of a medical device. Just as it would be laugh-
able for any other medical device or pharmaceutical
maker to think that they could hide these data and
hope to bring their product to market, we should
expect the same transparency from medical (and for
all wellness) apps. This transparency should be recog-
nized by all as a necessary (though not suﬃcient) pre-
condition for app review, whether by the FDA or by
extra-governmental means.
None of these suggestions will provide a panacea. In
fact, most of the proposals that I have bundled together
have been oﬀered before singly. The failure of any one
approach to catch on shows that each has its own hur-
dles to overcome. However, to use another analogy
from the medical industry, when we cannot ﬁnd a
cure, compounding may allow for a treatment regimen
whose sum is greater than its parts. As a worst case
scenario, this paper argues that managing symptoms
and monitoring the patient is preferable to ignoring
the illness with hopes that it will go away on its own.
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